

Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Tokyo, 6 May 1941
Arrival 7 May 1941
No. 685 of 6 May

1110 S.
100 Hours
Most urgent !

Re: Telegram No. 676 of 5 May for the German Foreign Minister

For the German Foreign Minister.

Today I had a rather long conversation with MATSUOKA whom I told the points of view contained in the foregoing telegram. MATSUOKA entirely agreed with my trend of thought, asking me to explain his conception of the present situation to the German Foreign Minister as follows.

He read the speech of the Fuehrer yesterday and is extremely impressed by the sureness and wisdom of the arguments. On the other hand, ROOSEVELT seems to him to have completely lost his head, judging from his hysterical invectives. Impressed by the Fuehrer's speech, he has sent to the German Foreign Minister through the Japanese Embassy in Berlin a telegram, of which he handed me a copy.

Turning to a discussion of the overall situation MATSUOKA stated that he intended to acquaint me with the American proposal as soon as he had achieved acceptance of his viewpoint by the authoritative quarters within the country. The American proposal probably originates in a report to WASHINGTON by the American ambassador in MOSCOW; he has known him for a long time and had a frank discussion with him at MOSCOW while on his trip back. The American ambassador, who did not conceal his critical attitude towards ROOSEVELT, asked him what JAPAN would do in case the United States should join the war. He replied that then Japan likewise would in any case immediately join the war on the side of the Axis powers. The Ambassador tried to soften this view point in that he tried to represent Japanese interference as possible in his report to WASHINGTON. He (MATSUOKA), however, emphasized most clearly that Japan would then strike.

Even on his way back to TOKYO he expected the American Counter move. When he arrived he found the American proposal of which I had been informed, and which skillfully caters to the needs of certain domestic political groups. At first, not only industry but likewise high Navy leaders had favored a serious discussion of the American proposal. Meanwhile he has used the interim to influence the Admiral, especially pointing

to the activistic groups of young officers in the Army and Navy who would determinedly resist such a policy. On Saturday a solemn group consisting of the Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior HIRANUMA and the Chief of the Army gave their consent to the interim reply which was communicated in the foregoing report; and gave a vote of confidence. At any rate, dealing with the American proposal will lead to strained relations with economic circles. He will try to manoeuver tactically in such a way that AMERICA will be pledged to non-participation in the European war, the more so since from the Fuehrer's speech he has gained the impression that German policy is pursuing this aim. However, he cherishes only meagre hopes as far as this is concerned since he personally presumes that the American developments in the direction of a participation in the war will continue at a quick pace. Just now he is having investigated the question whether a Japanese protest is not called for even against patrolling activity on the part of American armed forces amounting to the arbitrary creation of an American safety zone.

He would be grateful for the earliest possible information on the views of the German Foreign Minister concerning the American proposal /T.N. to be used/ for the unavoidable domestic political discussion.

As to the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, MATSUOKA reported that right after his departure from BERLIN, he did not envision the possibility of the settlement. During the conversation with the German Foreign Minister he also voiced this saying he would accept only in case RUSSIA showed readiness. In his opinion the neutrality pact was the off-shoot of Russian fear of Germany. He found STALIN absolutely willing to keep the peace. STALIN assured him that there could be no question of RUSSIA's concluding a pact with the Anglosaxon powers. One of his (MATSUOKA's) motives for concluding the neutrality pact had been to provide another hinderance to this pact. According to STALIN, the SOVIET Union did not join the Tripartite pact because the allied powers were not in need of Russian assistance. However, in case this was necessary, RUSSIA is prepared to co-operate extensively with the Tripartite powers. When I remarked that the SOVIET Union wanted to protect its rear and asked what attitude Japan would adopt regarding American shipments of armaments via VLADIVOSTOK in case of a German-Russian conflict, MATSUOKA answered as follows:

No Japanese Premier or Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral in the event of a German-Russian conflict. In this case, Japan would be driven, by the force of necessity to attack Russia at Germany's side. No neutrality pact could change this. Finally MATSUOKA voiced his opinion that American participation in the war could induce the Fuehrer to resolve upon a solution of the Russian question by violent means in order firmly to secure areas of supply, because the war would then probably drag on for a longer term. He is personally convinced of a speedy victory of the German forces in this case

I thanked MATSUOKA for his frank utterances, promising him to ask the German Foreign Minister for an opinion as soon as possible.

During my conversation today I have, of course, continued in my endeavors to direct Japanese policy toward SINGAPORE, in opposition to American interference manoeuvres and against the existing Japanese tendency to pay attention primarily to RUSSIA.

OTT.

Certificate:-

I, Ulrich Straus, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages, and as a result of the comparison between the German and the English texts, I have established that this is a true and correct translation of International Prosecution Document No. 4059-A.

/s/ Ulrich A. Straus

AFFIDAVIT

I, W. P. Cumming, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am an Attache of the United States Department of State on the staff of the United States Political Advisor on German Affairs, and as such I am a representative of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.). That in my capacity as above set forth, I have in my possession, custody, and control at the Berlin Documents Center, Berlin, Germany, the original captured German Foreign Office files and archives.

2. That said original Foreign Office files and archives were captured and obtained by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and upon their seizure and capture were first assembled by said military forces at a Military Document Center at Marburg, Germany, and were later moved by authorized personnel of said Allied forces to said central documents center, above referred to, and known as the Berlin Documents Center.

3. That I was assigned to said document center at Marburg, Germany, on August 15, 1945; and said captured German Foreign Office files and archives first came into my possession and control while I was stationed at Marburg, Germany, and that thereafter the same have continued in my possession and custody and under my control.

4. That the document to which this affidavit is attached is a true and correct photostatic copy of an original German Foreign Office document which was captured from said German Foreign Office files and archives, and which came into my possession and custody and under my control in the manner above set forth.

5. That said original document, of which the attached is a photostatic copy, is being held and retained by me in order that it may be examined and inspected by various interested agencies, and a photostatic copy of said original is hereby furnished and certified to because of the unavailability of said original for the reasons above set forth.

/s/ W. D. Cumming
W. P. CUMMING

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of April 1946.

/s/ G. H. Garde
G. H. GARDE
Lt. Colonel, AGD
Acting Adjutant General

OFFICE OF MILITARY
GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY (U.S.)

4059A

干渉、可能性ヲ表示シタイト云フ風ニシヨウト試ミタ。然レ彼
(松岡)ハ最モ明瞭ニソノ時日本ハ戦フダラウト強調シタ。

既ニ東京ヘ、帰途彼ハ「アメリカ」ノ又響ヲ期待シテ其
ソレ彼ハ到着シテアル内政上、諸派ノ要求ニ巧ミニ應ジテ其
私ニ既ニ報告サシタ「アメリカ」提案ヲ受取ッタ。先ツ第一ニ電
ニ産業界ノミナラス海軍、指導幹部モ亦「アメリカ」提案ノ真
創ナル討論ニ傾イテ其タ。彼ハ其間、時ヲ利用シテ提督
特ニ斯カル政策ヲ断時トシテ拒否スルデアラウ陸海軍、積極的
ナ青年將校連中ヲ因指シテ働キ掛ケタ。一曜日ニ首相平沼
内相及ビ陸軍長官ヨリ成ル嚴肅ナル一團ハ彼ニ對シ前報告ニ
報告シタル中間解答ニ對シ同意ヲ表シ信任投票ヲ言明シタ
然レモ其「アメリカ」提案ノ取扱ハ經濟界ト、緊張ニ導クデアラウ。
彼ハ「アメリカ」ヲ歐洲戰ヘ、不参加ヲ確定サセル。特ニ彼ハ總統ノ演説
カラ独逸ノ政策ガコノ目標ヲ追及ミテ其ルト云フ印象ヲ受ケテ其タ
ラ、戰術的ニソノウイフ風ニ行動スルヲ彼ハ試ミタイ。彼ハ個人的ニ「アメリ
カ」ノ参戦ヲ向メ發展迅速ヲ示シテ進ムト想像シテ其ルカス勿論此ノ
對シハ僅ハ弱イ希望ヲ要直イテ其ニスズス。

彼ハ結局ハ「アメリカ」ノ安全地帯ノ勝手ヲ創設トイフ結果ニ其ル所「アメリカ」
軍側ノ偵察活動モ亦日本ノ抗議ヲ起シハシタイカドウカノ問題ヲ目下吟
味セテ其レ。

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彼ハ不可避ナル内政上ノ議論、為「アメリカ」提案對シ独逸外務大臣
ノ見解ガ必ズ其タ其年ヲ彼ニ報告サシルナラバ有難イト思フダラウ。

日蘇中立條約成立就テ松岡ハベリニカラ、歸途彼ハ差ニアタリ締結
ノ可能性ヲ考慮シテ其ナカッタト報告シタ。独逸外務大臣トノ會談ニ於テ

4059A

彼、此、事、述、べ、ロ、シ、ヤ、ノ、用、意、ア、ル、場、合、ニ、ハ、受、諾、シ、タ、イ、ト、言、明、シ、タ、。

中、立、條、約、ハ、彼、ノ、見、解、ニ、依、リ、独、逸、ニ、對、ス、ル、ロ、シ、ヤ、ノ、畏、怖、ノ、產、物、デ、ア、リ、
彼、ハ、ス、タ、ー、リ、ン、ガ、絶、對、的、ニ、平、和、保、持、ノ、用、意、ヲ、持、ツ、テ、居、ル、コ、ト、ヲ、發、見、シ、
タ、。ス、タ、ー、リ、ン、ハ、彼、ニ、「ロ、シ、ヤ、ノ、ア、ニ、グ、ロ、サ、リ、ン、ニ、玉、子、ト、協、約、
云、フ、事、ハ、問、題、ニ、ナ、リ、得、ヌ、ト、保、證、シ、タ、。今、迄、コ、ノ、協、約、ヲ、邪、魔、ス、ル、事、
モ、中、立、條、約、締、結、ノ、彼、ノ、(松、岡)勳、機、一、デ、ア、リ、タ、。

ス、タ、ー、リ、ン、ノ、言、ニ、ヨ、リ、バ、同、盟、國、ハ、ロ、シ、ヤ、ノ、援、助、ヲ、必、要、ト、シ、タ、カ、ツ、カ、ラ、蘇、
聯、邦、ハ、三、國、同、盟、ニ、ハ、參、加、シ、タ、カ、ツ、タ、。然、レ、モ、必、要、ノ、場、合、ニ、ハ、ロ、シ、ヤ、ハ、三、國、同、
盟、國、ト、廣、汎、ニ、協、力、ノ、用、意、ガ、ア、ル、。蘇、聯、邦、ハ、有、後、ノ、掩、護、ヲ、得、シ、ト、欲、シ、
キ、ル、ト、云、フ、私、言、ニ、對、シ、且、ツ、独、逸、ノ、衝、突、ノ、場、合、「ラ、ヂ、オ、ス、ト、ク」經、由、「メ、
リ、カ」軍、需、品、ノ、供、給、ニ、對、シ、日、本、ハ、如、何、ナル、態、度、ニ、出、ヅ、ル、ヤ、ノ、私、
質、問、ニ、對、シ、テ、松、岡、ハ、次、如、ク、答、へ、タ、。

独、逸、ガ、蘇、聯、邦、ト、衝、突、ス、ル、場、合、日、本、ノ、如、何、ナル、総、理、大、臣、モ、如、何、
ナル、外、務、大、臣、モ、日、本、ヲ、中、立、ニ、保、ツ、事、ハ、決、シ、テ、出、来、ナ、イ、デ、ア、リ、タ、。コ、ノ、
場、合、日、本、ハ、自、然、必、然、性、ヲ、以、テ、独、逸、側、ニ、ツ、キ、テ、ロ、シ、ヤ、ヲ、攻、撃、ス、ル、機、
ニ、迫、ル、ミ、ル、デ、ア、リ、タ、。如、何、ナル、中、立、條、約、ト、雖、モ、シ、ノ、事、ヲ、変、更、シ、
得、ナ、イ、タ、。松、岡、ハ、最、後、ニ、彼、ノ、見、解、ヲ、概、歷、シ、タ、。即、チ、「ア、リ、カ」ノ、參、
戰、ハ、ソ、ノ、時、ノ、戰、争、ガ、恐、ラ、ク、長、ビ、ク、デ、ア、リ、タ、。補、給、地、域、ヲ、確、保、ス、ル、
為、ニ、「ロ、シ、ヤ」問、題、ヲ、腕、ガ、テ、解、決、ス、ル、決、意、ヲ、總、統、ニ、促、シ、得、ル、ト、
彼、ハ、個、人、的、ニ、コ、ノ、場、合、独、逸、ノ、武、力、ノ、迅、速、ナル、勝、利、ヲ、確、信、
シ、テ、居、ル、。

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私、ハ、松、岡、ニ、彼、ノ、率、直、ト、意、見、開、陳、ニ、感、謝、シ、且、ツ、独、逸、外、務、大、
臣、ニ、出、来、ル、ガ、レ、早、ク、見、解、ヲ、才、願、ヒ、ス、ル、様、彼、ニ、約、束、シ、タ、。

Doc 4059A

No 4

松本今日、會談ニ於テ「アメリカ」、妨害運動ニ抗シテ且ツ
何レニシテモ、先ヅ第一「ロシヤ」ニ注意スル現在、日本、
傾向ニ抗シテ、日本、政策ヲ「モニカホール」ニ向ケントスル松、
努力ヲ續ケタコトハ勿論デアル

トット

Doc. 4059A

書類第四。五九A號

證

余 Ulrich Straus は 余が獨逸語及び
日本語ニ精通セル者ナリト 並ニ 獨逸語原
文及び 日本語原文ヲ對照、上右ハ本書
類ヲ眞實ニ且正確ニ翻譯セルモノナリヲ
確證セルコトヲ茲ニ證ス

Ulrich A. Straus

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